The United States forced the Japanese government to officially recognize the nationalist government of Taiwan as a precondition for the conclusion of the peace settlement and the end of the occupation. A few months after the signing of the peace treaty, Yoshida, in a letter to US special envoy John F. Dulles, urged Tokyo to sign a bilateral peace treaty with the nationalist government of Taiwan. The so-called “Yoshida Letter” was published in America in the early months of 1952, which led to a harsh reaction from Communist China and heavy domestic criticism in Japan (Hosoya, 1984; Soeya, 2001). First, Japan has promised to align its China policy with US strategy, stating that it has no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with the PRC. Second, Japan has declared its intention to sign a peace treaty and resume diplomatic relations with Taiwan, although it does not recognize it as the legal representative of China as a whole. A 2017 study found that bilateral tax treaties, while they aim to “coordinate policies between countries to avoid double taxation and encourage international investment,” the unintended consequence of “allowing multinational enterprises to participate in contract purchases, state fiscal autonomy is limited and governments tend to: maintain lower tax rates.” [9] The 1949 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation governs the basic framework of bilateral relations between India and Bhutan. The Indo-Bhutanese trade agreement, first signed in 1972, was renewed every ten years until March 2005. The validity of the Treaty in its current form was extended by the exchange of letters from 26 to 27 February 2005 between the Ambassador of India and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bhutan until the entry into force of a new agreement.
Article I of the agreement provides for free trade and free trade between the two countries. However, Bhutan is allowed to impose non-tariff restrictions on Indian products necessary for the protection of Bhutanese industry (Article III). In addition, any country can impose import restrictions to protect public morality, human, animal and plant life, etc. (Article VI) (Mukherji, 2005).2 Japanese diplomacy after the Nixon shocks consisted essentially of two objectives: the normalization of its relations with China and the so-called “omnidirectional diplomacy” that culminated in the declaration of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977. As Soeya argued, the basic attitude of Japanese diplomacy toward China and Southeast Asia in the 970s was to regain diplomatic autonomy free from the logic of strategic rivalries between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union (Soeya, 1998a). Aware that the presence and commitment of the United States was diminishing, Japan sought to follow an autonomous path to China. The establishment of improved bilateral relations with ASEAN and Indochina was aimed at mitigating Japanese vulnerabilities, seeking economic benefits and stabilizing the regional security environment. Similarly, bilateral relations with South Korea improved significantly in the late 1970s. In fact, both countries were concerned about the US cuts and the increased Soviet military presence in the region. The first Nixon shock made Tokyo realize that it was lagging behind in terms of détente and a new international environment. As mentioned earlier, Yoshida had tried to pierce the bamboo curtain in the 1950s.
In the 1960s, Ikeda and Sato had tried to take a more positive stance through the “separation of politics and economics” (seikei bunri), but they were prevented from doing so by America`s insistence on keeping China isolated. In 1971, the constraints of rapprochement with China evaporated, allowing Japan to normalize relations with China before the United States. There has been a long debate on the merits of bilateralism versus multilateralism. The first rejection of bilateralism came after World War I, when many politicians concluded that the complex pre-war system of bilateral treaties had made war inevitable. This led to the founding of the Multilateral League of Nations (which was dissolved unsuccessfully after 26 years). Fiji`s interests in the Pacific focus on joining the South Pacific Forum, where it has been a founding member – in bilateral relations – of the Spearhead Melanesian Group, and those with other regional agencies. Fiji has always strongly opposed nuclear testing in the Pacific and the use of drift-net fishing. While supporting the promotion of the sustainable development of small island States (SIDS), it continued to draw attention to the particular environmental threats associated with the small Pacific islands. In a Buun Kuln relationship, there is also a sense of commitment that concerns mutual commitment and reciprocity.
Mutual commitment is the motivation and willingness to help the other party in a buun kuln relationship. The expectation that the other party will pay or do a favor is the reciprocal component of the relationship. This exchange of favors in both directions builds and strengthens the relationship between Buun Kuln. Economic agreements such as free trade agreements (FTAs) or foreign direct investment (FDI) signed by two states are a common example of bilateralism. Since most economic agreements are signed according to the specific characteristics of the contracting countries in order to grant each other preferential treatment, a general principle is not necessary, but a situational differentiation. Thus, bilateralism allows States to obtain tailor-made agreements and obligations that apply only to certain States parties. However, states will face a compromise because it is more wasteful on transaction costs than multilateral strategy. In a bilateral strategy, a new contract must be negotiated for each participant.
It therefore tends to be preferred when transaction costs are low and the surplus of members, which in economic terms corresponds to the “producer surplus”, is high. Moreover, it will be effective if an influential state wants to control small states from a liberal point of view, because building a series of bilateral agreements with small states can increase a state`s influence. [1] Buun Kuln is similar to the Chinese concept of Guanxi, where a relationship is based on mutual obligations arising from the continuous exchange of favors. Doing business right away is not the way the Chinese do business. Personal contact is preferred because it facilitates the feeling of commitment to maintaining the relationship (Niffenegger, Kulviwat and Engchanil, 2008). In a relationship with Buun Kuln, there is a sense of affection and commitment. Affection is the emotional bond between network members that leads to a sense of loyalty, solidarity and willingness to support each other. Such an emotional relationship is also often characterized by regular visits to each other`s homes, participation in regular joint activities, respect for seniors, and maintaining a harmonious relationship with others. Bilateral relations between Japan and China deteriorated during the tenure of Nobusuke Kishi (1956-60) for two different reasons. The first was the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty, which China denounced as a sign of the resurgence of Japanese militarism and a threat to its security. Mao strongly condemned the Far East Clause and the continued stationing of US troops in Japan. The second was Nobusuke Kishi, who became prime minister.
Kishi was a Class A war criminal and a former member of the Tojo government during the war.11 Since 1935, he had played a leading role in Japanese colonial rule in China and Manchuria. After the mass protest against Anpo in 1960, the overthrow of Kishi and the creation of a new cabinet led by a member of the Yoshida school, Hayato Ikeda, there was an immediate change in bilateral relations. The new government examined the possibility of establishing discreet economic contacts with the PRC and maintaining a minimum of autonomy in its Chinese policy (DNSA, 1961). The dramatic failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split prompted Ikeda to examine the possibility of unilateral détente with the PRC. In October 1962, Ikeda sent two diplomatic missions to the PRC to lay the groundwork for the growth of bilateral trade in the following years. As some qualified observers have pointed out, the main reason for the considerable success of the Vienna Convention in a particularly complex political context was certainly its functional and pragmatic approach. Of course, the formal regime established by the Vienna Convention did not reflect the wide variety of practices associated with current bilateral diplomatic relations, nor the actual political functions performed by the day-to-day work of resident embassies. Certainly, traditional methods of diplomatic communication and practice have undergone significant changes in recent decades.
The spectacular development of transport and telecommunications has become very important in embassies and has radically changed the methods of information and the possibilities of direct personal contact. Nevertheless, some of the most traditional diplomatic procedures, such as diplomatic correspondence in the form of letters or memoranda, still play an important role in international relations today. Diplomatic notes, for example, are often used for a variety of purposes, ranging from administrative matters to expressing a formal protest. Even in the most extreme circumstances, national governments affected by disasters strive to maintain some semblance of operational leadership and control. .