Prespa Agreement Nationality

The Prespa Agreement, ethnicity and nationality added by Severine Renard on 19 June 2019See all articles by Severine Renard → [29] Biljana Vankovska, “A diplomatic or geopolitical fairy tale as usual: a critical perspective of the agreement between Athens and Skopje” (to be published in the OSCE Yearbook 2018). On 23 January, just one day before ratification in the Greek Parliament, hundreds of scientists, professors, writers and artists from all over Greece signed petitions in support of the Prespa agreement. [103] [104] In addition, the agreement provides for the removal of the Vergina Sun from public use in the Republic of North Macedonia and the formation of a committee to review textbooks and maps in both countries in order to remove irredentist content and adapt it to UNESCO and Council of Europe standards. [11] These amendments were the subject of a referendum for the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in autumn 2018. Tsipras survived the vote with 145 members of his radical left party Syriza and 6 MPs who were Independent or Independent Greeks (ANEL). [96] [97] [98] In the days leading up to the ratification of the Prespa agreement by the Greek Parliament, more than 60,000 demonstrators (according to the police; 600,000 according to the organizers) from all over the country arrived in Athens to demand the rejection of the agreement; Some of these protests had turned violent, as police were forced to use tear gas to disperse the groups. [99] [35] Dragan Plavsic, “Macedonia, without Additions: why we must opposition the Tsipras-Zaev agreement,” Lefteast [accessed December 27, 2018]. Indeed, despite the insistence of external mediators that the name dispute has never addressed issues of ethnicity, nationality, culture and language, these issues seem to be central and the Achilles heel of the agreement at the same time. Certainly, if the agreement on Lake Prespa – which has the support of the necessary two-thirds of the members of the Macedonian parliament, which would also overturn a presidential veto – can help overcome Macedonia`s blocked status in its negotiations for accession to the European Union, it should be supported.

This is also the case when we consider that the corresponding majority in Parliament was obtained with the votes of the members of the VMRO-DPMNE. They may have only supported the bill in exchange for allowing the country`s convicted former president, Nikola Gruevski, to flee to Hungary. However, the agreement provides for the creation of a commission of international experts to enforce the paragraphs discussed here in the textbooks: “In doing so, it reshapes the identity of the next Generation north Macedonian. It is doubtful that such a dramatic reorientation of national identity has ever been undertaken in modern times. The peculiarity is that the [Northern Macedonian] national narrative is being shaped in the conversation with Greece. I don`t know if the Greeks understand how great it is. Imagine that another neighbor comes and decides with us how we perceive our history and identity. Instead of seeing them competitive, we must recognise that they too have taken a big step forward with this agreement and are helping them. In the face of strong internal opposition, the government has repeatedly argued that the PA has strengthened Macedonia`s ethnic and state identity. The implementation showed a different picture.

The official interpretation of the term Macedonian/Citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia is that it refers to nationality understood as citizenship (civil designation), rather than nationality as an ethnicity. The Prime Ministers of Macedonia and Greece, Zoran Zaev (right) and Alexis Tsipras (left) Source: meta.mk/en/telephone-conversation-between-tsipras-and-zaev-the-prespa-agreement-is-a-priority/ It seems that, at least within the framework of self-determination, there is an implicit recognition that peoples can at least freely pursue their own forms of culture and identity. It follows that it is for those peoples to determine the content of their culture or identity, including their collective name (Reimar 1995, p. 359). The right to ethnicity, nationality and identity is a fundamental principle of international law, a central principle of the international order. Because the existence of a nation is. a daily plebiscite, just as the existence of an individual is an eternal confirmation of life (Renan 1996, p. 41). Macedonians expressed their will and used the right to self-determination at least twice – in 1944 and 1991. According to the 2001 Ohrid Agreement and the amended constitution, “any other language spoken by at least 20% of the population is also an official language.” [49] However, it was not until January 2018 that Albanian was recognized as an official language at the national (but not international) level. [50] Nevertheless, President Ǵorge Ivanov refused to ratify this law; it has not been published or implemented.

[51] The June 2018 Prespa Sea Agreement again only mentions an “official language, the Macedonian language,” and does not recognize the linguistic, religious or confessional heterogeneity of Macedonian citizens. I assume that his argument will be advanced in this way in order to gain the support of the Slavic Macedonians – but without success, as the recent referendum showed strikingly. As political scientist Biljana Vankovska puts it: “The overwhelming majority of Macedonians […] is not willing to exchange his identity for a foreign policy reward. If part of the population had been open to the idea, she added, it would be the Albanians of Macedonia. [52] Your statement once again frames the dispute in relation to the macedonian internal dispute. Little seems to have developed since Arbën Xhaferi of the Albanian Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare, PDSH) wrote in 2001: North Macedonia is not implementing the agreement optimally: Greek government spokeswoman Aristotelia Peloni pointed to a tweet by North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev at the European Championships, referring to “Macedonia”(4)(5). Exiled from Hungary, fugitive former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski condemned the Prespa agreement, saying prime minister Zoran Zaev had “deceived” and “deceived” the Macedonian people about the country`s name change, and that Greek politicians had imposed an unfavorable deal on North Macedonia that spells out Greece`s exclusive claims to “ancient history.” [94] The analysis shows that the agreement went beyond the usual legal norms and instead penetrated the cultural sphere as well as the realm of collective and individual human rights. Thus, in terminis we are faced with a fundamental contradiction: the question of the name could hardly be defined legally and even less “solved” by legal means. Instead of deconstructing the protracted identity conflict between Greece and Macedonia, international mediators have decided to end the problems with an imposed agreement that is highly controversial both nationally and internationally. “Macedonian becomes synonymous with the nationality of all citizens of the Macedonian state, regardless of their ethnic origin. It is a solution that we have barely been able to imagine, let alone achieve.

This novelty is a Copernican touch. Instead of being faceless, the agreement introduces Macedonian nationality as a political term (demos). If this novelty becomes a constitutional category and is accepted by all our ethnic groups, and especially by the Albanians, then it will have a coherent effect on Macedonian society. .