Power Sharing Agreement Is Ideal Because

The integrative approach aims to build multi-ethnic political coalitions (again, usually political parties), to encourage political leaders to be moderate on divisive ethnic issues, and to strengthen the influence of minorities in majority decision-making. [6] Elements of an inclusive approach include electoral systems that favor pre-election pacts across ethnic boundaries, non-ethnic federalism that spreads power points, and public policies that favor political loyalties that are intergroup. Some suggest that inclusive power-sharing is theoretically superior, as it seeks to promote ethnic adaptation by promoting cross-cutting interests. Others, however, argue that the use of incentives to promote reconciliation will fail when confronted with deep-rooted enmities that underlie ethnic conflicts and harden during a brutal civil war. Table 2 summarizes this option and the practices and issues associated with it. A long-standing misconception about power-sharing possibilities for intractable conflicts is that there is a unique formula for power-sharing, which has been called “conssociationalism” for many years. [1] The elements of this approach to power-sharing are well known: grand coalitions, proportional representation, cultural autonomy or federalism, mutual veto. But this prototype of power-sharing is only one of the actually very broad policy options for resolving ethnic conflicts, the core of which may differ exceptionally in terms of objectives, structures and impact on promoting moderation and compromise between groups. What are the main options for power-sharing? [2] However, power-sharing is not a panacea.

In fact, some types of power-sharing systems may contain the seeds of their own self-destruction, as the search for consensus on the part of political leaders who are aware that they have the right to veto government action ends in a stalemate. In addition, some elements of the status quo will forcibly reject power-sharing, as did elements of Rwandan paramilitary groups in 1994 in opposition to last year`s Arusha Agreement, leading to the worst genocide since World War II. When parties to persistent conflicts — particularly in societies divided by profound ethnic, racial or religious differences — find that they are unable to emerge from the conflict, but seek a compromise that ensures a permanent place at the negotiating table, they can turn to power-sharing as a possible solution. Power-sharing is a term used to describe a system of government in which a permanent part of power is made available to all major segments of society; This system is often compared to systems of government and opposition, in which ruling coalitions alternate between different social groups over time. This essay assesses recent experiences of power-sharing as a way to live together in situations of persistent conflict. It provides a classification of power-sharing patterns and includes examples of different approaches in practice. The conclusion for practitioners is to recognize that power-sharing may be desirable and necessary as an immediate result of deadly conflicts, especially those conducted in the name of ethnic identity. In the long run, however, rigid power-sharing is not a permanent solution to intractable conflicts. Ideally, power-sharing should wither over time as trust builds up and the uncertainty of a more “normal” majority-government democracy becomes acceptable. At the same time, practitioners should think innovatively about options that can enable such a shift from formal power-sharing – often by exclusive ethnic groups – to a more socially inclusive and integrated form of representation.

To reconcile immediate imperatives with the sustainability of peace over time, power-sharing will work best when it can wither away over time. Whether in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Bosnia or Lebanon, in the short term, formal power-sharing has been an effective confidence-building tool to ensure that all groups capable of corrupting a peace settlement are involved in institutions and influence decision-making. Over time, however, post-war societies must move beyond the mutual hostage-taking implied by a guaranteed place at the decision-making table, the impasse it inevitably creates, and the building of post-war societies around the firm and inflexible social boundaries of ethnicity. [2] For a more complete overview of power-sharing options, see Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (1995), and Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, eds. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (1998). In many situations, the international community is working proactively to encourage the parties to share power rather than wage war. In Afghanistan, for example, following the fall of the Taliban in the Bonn negotiations in December 2001, international mediators worked hard to ensure that the interim (now permanent) transitional government hamid Karzai was broadly representative of the major ethnic groups in this highly diverse and long-standing conflict-torn country. In Côte d`Ivoire, French mediators negotiated a pact in early 2003 to end the country`s civil war; Rebel commanders eventually accepted appointments to a revamped cabinet. These are the basic principles of power-sharing as traditionally conceived: Mark Gerzon reflects on the meaning of symbols of power in his moderation of a withdrawal from the US Congress. The intelligent design of power-sharing institutions, however cautious it may be, cannot solve some of the inherent problems that lead to discord and the inability to reach consensus in today`s deeply divided societies. If thoughtful analysis and intelligent design were enough, the Cyprus dispute — which opposes the settlement even though United Nations mediators have worked hard for years on every detail of a mutually acceptable power-sharing solution — would likely have been resolved decades ago. Unfortunately, recent efforts by the international community to negotiate the adoption of the United Nations power-sharing plan appear to have failed again in early 2003.

[11] However, if Cypriots and others in similar situations are ready to settle, they will face fundamental decisions about power-sharing and how best to do so. As a means of overcoming persistent social conflicts, there does not seem to be an alternative. Gates, Scott & Kaare Strøm (2007) Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict – Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes, CSCW Policy Brief, 1. Oslo: PRIO. Power-sharing solutions are good transitional tools, but in the long run, the best outcome may well be a much more fluid form of democracy that allows for the creation of flexible coalitions that bridge the ethnic divide. A central issue, which has not yet been thoroughly investigated, is the question under what conditions power-sharing and consensus-based forms of democracy can be transformed into more flexible institutions that can promote reconciliation and a broader national identity. .